INTRODUCTION
Laws are spiders' webs through which the big flies pass and in which the little ones are caught.
-Honoré dè Balzac 1 On May 24, 2016, Chevelle Nesbeth entered the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, New York, prepared to be sentenced to anywhere from thirty-three to forty-one months in prison. 2 What she encountered, however, was mercy. District Judge Frederic Block sentenced Nesbeth to one year of probation and no prison time. 3 About a year earlier, Nesbeth was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport for attempting to smuggle 600 grams of cocaine in her suitcases. 4 Thousands of low-level drug couriers are sentenced to prison each year, 5 many with stories like Nesbeth's. At the time of her arrest, Nesbeth was nineteen years old, living with her mother, and working to pay her way through college. 6 Nesbeth had never had any trouble with the law until her boyfriend convinced her to visit some friends in Jamaica. 7 He purchased Nesbeth's plane ticket and told her to bring two suitcases back to the United States. 8 Hidden in the suitcases' handles was 1.3 pounds of cocaine, which U.S. Customs and Border Patrol seized upon Nesbeth's arrival. 9 In his opinion, Judge Block stated that his decision to spare Nesbeth of approximately three years in prison was largely driven by the collateral consequences that she would suffer after her term of incarceration ended. 10 Judge Block also opined that despite his leniency in sentencing, legislative action was ultimately necessary to effectively mitigate the consequences of a felony conviction for low-level participants in drug-trafficking offenses. 11 This Note offers one potential legislative solution that would allow low-level drug couriers like Nesbeth to avoid the devastating consequences attending heightened sentences that far outweigh the culpability for low-level drug offenses. 12 The current legal landscape governing drug trafficking first emerged in the 1980s, when the United States's drug laws underwent a massive transformation; Congress, determined to win its "War on Drugs," enacted several pieces of legislation intended to curb the influx of drugs into the United States. 13 Also in the 1980s, Congress amended federal sentencing laws to limit judicial discretion. 14 This undertaking involved adding stringent mandatory minimum penalties to many of the federal drug statutes. 15 Lawmakers operated under the assumption that the quantity of drugs a person possessed correlated to the individual's culpability; therefore, lawmakers tied the severity of the mandatory minimum penalties to the weight of the drugs seized. 16 7. Caplan, supra note 6. 8. Id. 9. Id. 10. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 190-93 (explaining the long-term consequences of incarcerating low-level drug offenders).
11. Id. at 198 ("It is for Congress and the states' legislatures to determine whether the plethora of post-sentence punishments imposed upon felons is truly warranted, and to take a hard look at whether they do the country more harm than good.").
12. See infra Part IV (proposing a legislative amendment to the federal importation statute). This Note focuses solely on federal enforcement policy. While there are applicable state laws under which couriers can be charged, this Note will not address them. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION-AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 13 (2017) ("A major barrier to reform . . . is the fractured nature of our criminal justice system. In fact, there is no single 'criminal justice system,' but instead a vast patchwork of systems that vary in almost every conceivable way."). Low-level drug couriers have suffered major consequences as a result of these increased penalties. 17 Drug-trafficking organizations target vulnerable individuals-typically women 18 -to become drug couriers in smuggling operations. 19 Couriers often lack strong ties to the larger drug-trafficking conspiracy, and they are recruited only for the limited purpose of drug transportation. 20 This job description means that couriers are in possession of often large quantities of drugs, which exposes them to significant mandatory minimum penalties but does not necessarily indicate a high status within the drug organization. 21 For example, a courier in possession of just over one pound (or 500 grams) of cocaine might face a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. 22 To make matters worse, because drug couriers have little involvement in the larger drug-trafficking conspiracy, they typically lack the valuable information needed to trade to the authorities in exchange for leniency. 23 As a result, low-level drug couriers have very few options to avoid the stringent mandatory minimum sentences, and any options they do have may only provide limited relief. 24 Even where couriers are lucky enough to appear before a judge who spares them of any jail time, they still face the long-term consequences of being labeled a convicted felon. 25 Take Chevelle Nesbeth for example, who had to switch her college major from education to sociology because it is likely that her felony conviction will prohibit her from becoming a teacher. 26 This Note explores the discrepancy between the actual culpability of lowlevel drug couriers and the harsh penalties that they face. This Note evaluates the costs that current policies impose on individual defendants and society as 17 . U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 5, at 167 (estimating that high-level drug suppliers and importers account for less than 11 percent of federal drug cases). 24. See infra Part I.B.2.b (explaining the safety valve provision as a possible avenue of relief from mandatory minimum penalties).
25. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the effects of a felony conviction on, inter alia, employment prospects and eligibility for public benefits).
26. Caplan, supra note 6. Ms. Nesbeth's lawyer also commented that despite Judge Block's leniency, "all these doors . . . are closed to [Nesbeth] based on her conviction." Weiser, supra note 4. a whole. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the costs of harsh penalties for low-level drug couriers far outweigh the benefits and, therefore, proposes a legislative amendment to remedy these defects.
Part I of this Note outlines the federal statutes that govern the prosecution of drug couriers and provides a brief history of the trajectory of this legal regime. Part II then surveys the experiences and backgrounds of individuals who are recruited as low-level drug couriers. Part II also highlights the increased use of women as low-level drug couriers and addresses likely explanations for why certain individuals are more vulnerable to drug courier recruitment. Part III illustrates how the costs of the current policies outweigh the benefits, and Part IV addresses these failures by proposing a legislative amendment to the federal importation statutes that would create a carveout for low-level drug couriers.
I. THE DRUG-TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT REGIME: FEDERAL STATUTORY AND SENTENCING LAWS GOVERNING THE IMPORTATION OF NARCOTICS
Many of the developments to the law governing the prosecution of drug couriers occurred in the 1980s, and these policies have remained largely unchanged since then. 27 This Part discusses these developments and explains the law as it currently stands. Part I.A provides a brief history of the development of the current enforcement regime and specifically focuses on the history of the "War on Drugs" and sentencing reform, including the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the rise of mandatory minimum sentences. Part I.B outlines the legal landscape of federal enforcement of drug-trafficking crimes by highlighting the relevant statutes used to prosecute drug couriers. It also discusses the two primary methods of departure from mandatory minimum penalties:
the "substantial assistance" provision and the "safety valve" provision.
A. How We Got Here: A Brief History of the "War on Drugs," the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Rise of Mandatory Minimum Sentences
This section explains the social context that informed President Ronald Reagan's reforms, reviews the key pieces of legislation passed in the 1980s, and discusses the impact of that legislation on the enforcement of drug crimes today.
Sentencing Policy Leading Up to the 1980s
The current enforcement regime of drug crimes in the United States is rooted in President Richard Nixon's famous declaration of America's "War on Drugs" in 1971. 28 legislation that severely limited judicial discretion in sentencing 29 and imposed stringent mandatory minimum penalties for a wide range of drugrelated offenses. 30 President Reagan's legislative reforms can be characterized as reactionary measures designed to steer the prosecution of drug crimes toward a different approach than those used in the decades leading up to the 1980s. 31 Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in 1984, judges had broad and nearly unlimited discretion to impose sentences that would best serve to rehabilitate the individual offender. 32 Justice Hugo Black articulated these principles in Williams v. New York 33 : "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." 34 The rationale behind rehabilitation-based sentencing can be analogized to a doctor's diagnosis and treatment of a patient's disease. 35 For example, a conscientious physician would not give the same dose of chemotherapy to a thirty-year-old as she would to an eighty-year-old, even if the two patients suffered from the exact same form of cancer. 36 It follows that "[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-to [the judge's] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics" 37 so the sentencing judge can similarly make the right sentencing "diagnosis" for the defendant.
While these principles aptly addressed the individualized, rehabilitative goal of criminal law, many commentators criticized the discretionary policies for producing significant sentencing disparities between similarly situated offenders. 38 Critics of these policies frequently cited studies demonstrating the effect of gender, race, and socioeconomic status as predictors of 29 353 (1979) (noting that sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders "can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and correctional authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence").
sentences. 39 These overt disparities armed the Reagan administration with the necessary political ammunition it needed to enact groundbreaking sentencing reform legislation throughout the 1980s.
2. Sentencing Reform and the "War on Drugs"
The first of several key pieces of legislation came when Congress enacted the SRA in 1984 40 as part of the larger Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 41 The SRA sought to "reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity and eliminate the sentencing impact of extralegal factors." 42 More specifically, the SRA set out to accomplish three goals. First, it sought to promote certainty and honesty-Congress wanted offenders to actually serve their full sentence. 43 Therefore, the SRA abolished the federal parole system in favor of a "real time" sentencing scheme. 44 That is, judges would sentence defendants to concrete terms of imprisonment that defendants served completely without the opportunity for parole. 45 Second, the drafters of the SRA wanted to advance uniformity and eliminate the disparities in sentencing that were criticized throughout the 1970s. 46 Finally, the SRA sought to increase proportionality in sentencing by punishing offenders based on their culpability. 47 To achieve these goals, the SRA established the U.S. Sentencing Commission (the "Commission"), which was charged with creating guidelines that satisfied the broader themes of "just punishment" or retribution, 48 specific and general deterrence, 49 incapacitation of dangerous offenders, 50 and limited forms of rehabilitation. 51 The Commission is an independent agency of the judicial branch. 52 After decades of unfettered judicial discretion in sentencing, the SRA transformed the criminal justice system in one swift stroke by implementing a uniform set of sentencing guidelines that every federal judge was required to follow. 53 Two years after enacting the SRA, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into law. 54 In an attempt to address America's drug problem, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act imposed stringent mandatory minimum sentences for manufacturing, transporting, distributing, and possessing illegal narcotics. 55 Then, in 1988, the Reagan administration passed the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, 56 which established, inter alia, mandatory minimum penalties for the simple possession of five or more grams of crack cocaine. 57 By shifting the focus from the offender's role in the conspiracy toward the quantity of drug involved, 58 these pieces of legislation "increased the likelihood that mandatory minimum penalties would apply equally to major traffickers, mid-level dealers, and low-level participants." 59
See

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The SRA authorized the Commission to establish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") to eliminate the disparate sentencing of similarly situated offenders. 60 The Commission designed the Guidelines to determine sentences based on both the offense committed and offender's criminal history. 61 First, the Guidelines dictate an appropriate sentence range based on the base level offense. 62 Then, offenders are eligible to receive a number of upward or downward adjustments based on several factors. 63 The Guidelines remained mandatory for decades-judges lacked discretion to 54 veer outside the prescribed guidelines range except in extraordinary circumstances. 64 In United States v. Booker, 65 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the mandatory Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and declared the Guidelines merely advisory. 66 As a result, the Court reinvested judges with some of the discretion that the SRA and subsequent pieces of legislation had taken away. 67 Yet despite Booker, courts, including the Supreme Court, have been reluctant to exercise this discretion. 68 For example, in Gall v. United States, 69 the Court explained that district courts "should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range." 70 Furthermore, the Booker decision did not affect the constitutionality of mandatory minimum penalties, which take precedence over Guideline sentences and thus limit judicial discretion in sentencing. 71 Thus, even if a judge wishes to depart from a Guidelines-prescribed sentence, if the crime triggers a statutory mandatory minimum penalty, the judge must impose at least the mandatory minimum. 72 In order to evade these minimums, the prosecutor must file a motion for departure based on the substantial assistance provision 73 or the defendant must qualify for the safety valve departure. 74 Because of the widespread use of mandatory minimum penalties for enforcing drug-trafficking crimes, 75 Booker's impact has been relatively limited in drug courier prosecutions, and the law continues to promote a more uniform system of sentencing, with little discretion afforded to sentencing judges.
B. Federal Enforcement of Drug-Trafficking Laws
Reagan-era sentencing reforms continue to impact and inform the current state of affairs. This section explores the current statutory scheme. by discussing the statutes used to prosecute drug couriers and the mandatory minimum penalties the statutes prescribe. It also discusses the substantial assistance and safety valve provisions-the two main ways defendants can avoid mandatory minimum penalties.
The Federal Importation Statute and Corresponding Mandatory
Minimum Penalties
When authorities catch a drug courier smuggling drugs into the United States, the courier is typically charged under the federal importation statute. 76 Offenders convicted of importing "controlled substances" 77 are sentenced according to 21 U.S.C. § 960, which requires that offenders be given mandatory minimum penalties tied to the weight of the drugs involved. 78 Where an individual, in contravention of 21 U.S.C. § 952, knowingly or intentionally imports or exports one kilogram or more of heroin 79 or five kilograms or more of cocaine, 80 he or she faces a ten-year mandatory minimum penalty. 81 Similarly, offenders are subject to a five-year mandatory minimum penalty if they are found guilty of importing or exporting 100 grams or more of heroin 82 or 500 grams or more of cocaine. 83 Section 952, which makes it a crime to knowingly import drugs into the United States, 84 arose out of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 85 which was part of President Nixon's early effort to address America's drug problem.
The more important legislative development actually came in 1986, when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act amended § 960 (the "1986 Amendments") to include mandatory minimum penalties tied to the weight of the unlawfully imported drugs. 86 The legislative history surrounding the 1986 Amendments illustrates Congress's concern with increased drug use in the United States and its desire to restrict the supply of drugs. 87 To that end, a 1986 House Judiciary Committee report advocated the view that the law should primarily target the high-level traffickers and organizational heads responsible for trafficking large quantities of drugs into the United States. 88 The same report also noted that Congress's second level of focus should be the street-level dealers. 89 Operating under the assumption that drug quantity correlates with status within the drug organization and individual culpability, 90 Congress structured the mandatory minimum penalties to depend on the weight of the drugs involved. 91 Interestingly, the committee report lacks any mention of targeting the lowlevel couriers who merely transport the drugs from place to place. 92 While it is impossible to draw inferences about congressional intent from a failure to mention one subset of people in a committee report, the report's discussion about organizational heads and mid-level dealers as the two greatest threats lends support to the notion that the 1986 Amendments were designed to capture the proverbial whales, not the minnows. 93 The only committee report specifically mentioning drug couriers refers to more sophisticated, high-level couriers who transport drugs via private aircraft. 94 In explaining the importance of authorizing appropriations for the U.S. Customs Service and its air interdiction mission, that report emphasizes that, at the time, 62 percent of cocaine entering the United States arrived in small, private aircraft. 95 Notably, this report does not mention low-level couriers, which further bolsters the argument that lawmakers were much more concerned with higher-level players when enacting the 1986 Amendments. 96 
Departing from the Mandatory Minimum Penalties
When a courier is caught with a sufficient quantity of drugs to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence, 97 the law provides two main avenues of departure: (1) the substantial assistance provision; and (2) the safety valve. Defendants may also find relief if the prosecutor declines to charge the An individual convicted of a drug-trafficking offense can avoid a mandatory minimum penalty by providing "substantial assistance" to law enforcement. 99 The substantial assistance provision allows the court, upon a motion by the government, to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum "so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 100 The Guidelines include a similar provision, which allows judges to depart from the Guideline-determined sentence range if no mandatory minimum exists. 101 The Guidelines also specify factors that sentencing judges should consider when determining the extent of the sentence reduction, such as the "significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance"; 102 "the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant"; 103 "the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance"; 104 "any injury suffered, . . . or risk of injury to the defendant or his [or her] family resulting from his [or her] assistance"; 105 and "the timeliness of the defendant's assistance." 106 According to the commentary, the government's evaluation of the defendant's assistance should be accorded much deference, "particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain." 107
b. The Safety Valve Provision
The second way a defendant can obtain a departure from the mandatory minimum penalty is through the safety valve provision. 108 disproportionately long mandatory sentences. 110 The safety valve was designed to serve as a narrow exemption for nonviolent, low-level offenders. 111 Under the safety valve provision, the court may depart from a statutory mandatory minimum penalty if the following criteria are met:
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; (4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with the requirement. 112 The safety valve differs from the substantial assistance departure in two key ways. First, the safety valve does not require a motion from the government. 113 Instead, judges have discretion to apply the safety valve provision if the defendant satisfies the five criteria. 114 Second, the fifth element of the safety valve provision explicitly states that the information defendants provide to the government need not be new and useful, so long as it is comprehensive and truthful. 115 Though not mandatory, 116 the Guidelines are instructive in determining how much relief to provide to safety-valve-eligible defendants. 117 The Guidelines state that defendants meeting the safety valve criteria "for whom the statutorily required minimum sentence is at least five years, the offense 113. See Bronn, supra note 58, at 482. 114. In this respect, the safety valve is an excusal, rather than a departure, from the mandatory minimum sentence. Id.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (" [T] he fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.").
116. 119 And while judges are free to disregard the Guidelines in imposing a sentence, the Guidelines nonetheless serve as an important starting point and remain influential in sentencing. 120
c. The Rise and Fall of the Holder Memo
In 2013, then-U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder set forth a policy that sought to avoid charging low-level participants in drug crimes under statutes that triggered mandatory minimum sentences. 121 The Holder Memo, as it became known, instructed Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) to conduct an individualized assessment of each defendant prosecuted under a Controlled Substances Act statute with a mandatory minimum sentence to determine whether the defendant was, in fact, a low-level participant. 122 AUSAs were to weigh several criteria, including whether the conduct involved the use of violence or weapons, whether the crime involved minors, whether death or serious bodily injury resulted, whether the defendant was a leader within the criminal organization, whether he or she had significant ties to large-scale drug-trafficking organizations, and finally, whether the defendant had a criminal history. 123 If, based on those factors, the AUSA was satisfied that the defendant was indeed a low-level participant, the Holder Memo instructed the AUSA to decline to charge the quantity of drugs sufficient to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence. 124 This policy allowed many lowlevel drug couriers, like Chevelle Nesbeth, 125 to escape § 960's mandatory minimum sentences. 126 However A describes the role of drug couriers in larger drug-trafficking schemes, distinguishes between experienced and lowlevel drug couriers, and provides a more in-depth analysis of low-level couriers as a particular group of interest. Part II.B assesses the circumstances that push individuals toward low-level drug smuggling. First, Part II.B highlights the high-risk, low-reward reality of being a low-level drug courier, and then it seeks to explain why individuals choose to become couriers by analyzing the widespread fear and poverty prevalent in communities affected by the drug trade.
A. The Role of the Drug Courier and the Rise of Low-Level Drug Couriers
Drug couriers are responsible for smuggling drugs from one point to another, often across international borders. 131 Although many drug couriers occupy the lowest levels of the drug organization's hierarchy, 132 unwitting agents of the organization's higher-ups; some couriers run sophisticated operations to smuggle drugs across borders. 134 For example, some drug-trafficking organizations employ trained high-level couriers to fly private aircraft filled with illegal narcotics into the United States. 135 In fact, the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 specifically mentions this subset of drug couriers as a particular threat. 136 Other drug couriers-through experience-have developed effective methods of bypassing law enforcement's detection efforts at the border. 137 As law enforcement ramped up interdiction efforts and developed new methods to detect and apprehend drug couriers, drug-trafficking organizations responded with innovative ways to insulate high-level members and continue smuggling drugs into the United States, which included recruiting outside individuals to act as drug couriers. 138 These lowlevel drug couriers have little to no involvement in the larger drug-trafficking operation and, as a result, possess limited information of value to law enforcement in the event that they are apprehended. 139 Low-level drug couriers typically know only the name of the person who gave them the drugs (who is usually located in a foreign country) 140 and the person to whom they are supposed to deliver the drugs (who is likely known by an alias or even just by a general description). 141 resources that they are willing to sacrifice to the authorities in order to protect themselves and their larger operation. 142 Large drug-trafficking organizations, in their efforts to evade law enforcement and border agents, have increasingly recruited women to smuggle drugs into the United States 143 because they believe that women are more effective drug couriers. From the perspective of law enforcement officers, for example, women may appear less dangerous and thus less suspicious. 144 Furthermore, women are perceived to have certain physical advantages when it comes to concealment because they can transport drugs vaginally, between their breasts, in brassieres or other female clothing articles, or in faked pregnancies. 145 Female couriers have even smuggled drugs in breast or buttocks implants. 146 While drug-trafficking organizations do not exclusively use women as drug couriers, 147 the perceived advantages of using women have made female drug couriers a significant subgroup of individuals involved in drug smuggling. 148 
B. Motivations of Low-Level Drug Couriers
To design effective criminal justice policies, it is critical to understand why individuals commit crimes. This section describes the risks that low-level drug couriers face and the benefits they derive. It also discusses the factors that frequently drive individuals into these situations. organizational status and culpability. 150 Because of the mandatory minimum penalties in place, if they smuggle enough drugs, drug couriers can receive long prison sentences despite their low status within the drug-trafficking organization. 151 Furthermore, they are often intentionally kept in the dark about the inner workings of the drug-trafficking organization, so they lose out on a valuable bargaining chip with prosecutors and are deprived of an opportunity to qualify for the substantial assistance departure. 152 In addition to assuming significant legal risk, drug couriers often undertake risks to their health and physical well-being. 153 In cases where couriers have ingested pellets of drugs-such as cocaine or heroin-the risk of death or serious bodily injury is extremely high if the pellet opens while inside the courier. 154 Despite these risks, low-level couriers rarely stand to benefit from the sale of the drugs they carry. 155 Drug couriers are generally paid a relatively small, flat fee for their services and do not receive a share of the profits like more highly ranked members of the organization do. 156 While a few thousand dollars may be enough to affect the circumstances of those recruited to be low-level drug couriers, 157 it is a rather inconsequential sum compared to the profits generated by the drug-trafficking organization. 158 In 2016, the average retail price for a gram of cocaine in the United States, adjusted for 154. See Alcaraz, supra note 153 (describing drug-filled capsules as "ticking time bombs"); Navarro, supra note 141 (discussing how ingesting heroin pellets, while less risky than ingesting cocaine pellets, nonetheless results in many deaths when the pellets open).
155. See Wasserman, supra note 140, at 651 ("Like a beast of burden, [the courier] was employed to transport another's goods, ignorant of the heightened risks (mainly to herself) or heightened benefits (entirely to another) . . . .").
156. One empirical study on drug couriers' pay found that the median compensation for couriers caught at purity, was $165. 159 A courier carrying 900 grams of cocaine, 160 for example, may be paid a few thousand dollars as a flat fee 161 despite having delivered a product that could potentially yield over $148,000 in retail value. 162 Similarly, in 2016, the average street value of heroin was $491 per gram, adjusted for purity, 163 so a courier delivering the same amount brings in over $441,000 for the organization. Considering the legal and health risks that couriers assume, as well as the value they bring to the drug-trafficking organizations that recruit them, low-level drug couriers are paid far less than what their services are worth. Understanding what drives low-level drug couriers to undertake such highrisk, low-reward assignments is crucial in assessing the effectiveness of the current policies 164 and addressing their flaws. 165 One of the main motivators for low-level drug couriers is fear. This is particularly true for the large numbers of female drug couriers involved in relationships with men who have strong ties to drug-trafficking organizations. 166 As one scholar notes, while the wife or partner of an individual who commits a white collar crime is often shielded from criminal activity, the wife or partner of a drug dealer is much more exposed. 167 Women who are physically and psychologically abused by male drug dealers in their lives are especially susceptible to involvement and participation in the overarching drug-trafficking enterprise. 168 171 This DEA agent lamented that Mexican civilians will not provide law enforcement with information on the Sinaloa Cartel, for example, because "[t]hey know their family back home will be killed." 172 The agent's testimony illustrates the immense power that drugtrafficking organizations wield in their communities and the relative ease with which they force ordinary citizens to act on their behalf.
Poverty and lack of economic opportunity are other powerful drivers for the recruitment of low-level drug couriers. Many low-level drug couriers come from backgrounds that afford them little opportunity to obtain prosperous livelihoods. 173 This is especially true for women in certain cultures, like those in Latin America and the Caribbean, where deep-set gender norms have discouraged women from obtaining an education and gainful employment. 174 For example, one empirical study of the drug trade in Barbados found that poverty was a key motivator for women employed as drug couriers. 175 The situation can be even more dire for women who are the sole caretakers of children. One woman arrested for smuggling drugs explained the situation, saying: "You could face the fact of being in prisonbut then again, having four kids, working day and night, you're a mother on your own, you haven't got any father . it one of the world's major drug transshipment points as it is situated between South America-the world's largest producer of cocaine, and its main markets in the United States of America and Europe.").
175. Id. at 121; see also Huling, supra note 143, at 59 (explaining that women often become involved in the drug-trafficking business as a survival strategy in the face of economic necessity).
change-not only for yourself but for your kids." 176 Moreover, women with sole responsibilities for their children may face greater difficulties in obtaining an education or steady employment. 177 These circumstances likely propel women into a vicious cycle of necessity and desperation where lowlevel drug smuggling might appear to be the only way to make ends meet. 178 Drug-trafficking organizations also stand to benefit and thus exploit these situations, as widespread poverty increases the pool of potential recruits to smuggle drugs across borders at low cost to the organization. 179 Notwithstanding the realities low-level drug couriers face, 180 they suffer astonishingly severe punishments under the current laws. 181 
III. FAILURES OF THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT REGIME
Taking into consideration the current state of the law and the individuals impacted by it, this Part analyzes the costs and benefits of the current drug enforcement regime. Part III.A begins by exploring the costs of current enforcement policies, including the financial costs and the less easily quantifiable collateral costs that the policies impose on innocent third parties and on formerly incarcerated individuals. Next, this Part analyzes purported benefits of the current policies. Part III.B unpacks the common justification that harsh penalties are necessary to induce low-level participants to provide information about higher-level dealers and distributors. Finally, Part III.C evaluates current policies through the lenses of the various theories of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. This Part ultimately illustrates that the current regime's costs outweigh its benefits and that reforms are necessary to address these imbalances.
A. High Costs of Current Enforcement Policies
The policy of pursuing harsh sentences for low-level offenders like drug couriers has contributed to a surge in the prison population. 182 The total U.S. prison population 183 has ballooned from approximately 300,000 in 1980 to nearly 1.5 million in 2016-a 500 percent increase. 184 And for drug crimes alone, the number of individuals incarcerated in federal prison grew from 4700 to nearly 82,000 over the same period. 185 led to significant economic costs as the United States spends an average of roughly $36,000 per federal inmate annually. 186 Perhaps more significant than the financial costs, however, is the collateral damage that incarceration imposes on families of incarcerated individuals and the long-term consequences suffered by individuals after they are released from incarceration.
The Effects on Families and Children
When a judge sentences an individual with children to a term of incarceration, the judge inevitably assesses a penalty on the child or children of that individual. 187 Judges should consider this impact on children when calculating the costs of a criminal justice policy. 188 But, despite the welldocumented effects that parental incarceration has on children, the Guidelines instruct courts to disregard these effects when crafting an "appropriate" sentence. 189 In general, parental incarceration is correlated with a wide range of detrimental effects on a child's development. 190 When a parent is sentenced to prison time, children often experience grief, anxiety, and depression, which psychologists have equated to the emotional responses associated with the death of a loved one, abuse, or domestic violence. 191 In addition to mental health effects, parental incarceration is also associated with adverse physical health outcomes, like childhood obesity and asthma. 192 The children of incarcerated parents also experience significant long-term effects that may inhibit their educational and occupational achievement. 193 188. This is not to say that defendants with children are less culpable or deserving of less punishment than defendants without children. It is only intended to convey the reality that incarceration imposes costs on third parties other than the defendant, which must be considered to accurately determine whether the benefits of a criminal justice policy outweigh the costs. after a parent's release, these negative impacts often persist and last through adulthood: parental incarceration is a "strong risk factor for antisocial behavior, future offending, . . . drug abuse, school failure, and unemployment." 194 According to one study, children who experience the trauma of losing a parent to the criminal justice system are five times more likely than other children to end up incarcerated as adults. 195 These effects are particularly pronounced for the children of drug couriers because women represent a significant number of the individuals convicted of importing drugs into the United States. 196 This reality is important for two reasons. First, 80 percent of the total number of incarcerated women in the United States are mothers. 197 Second, incarcerated women are more likely than incarcerated men to be the sole caregivers to their children. 198 When a drug courier is sent to prison, there is a high likelihood that her children are losing not only a parent, but the only parent in their household. 199 The effects can be devastating because these children are likely to experience the aforementioned psychological, physical, and socioeconomic difficulties, 200 and to a more severe degree. 201 As noted by Judge Weinstein, "Removing the mother in such a matriarchal setting destroys the children's main source of stability and guidance and enhances the possibility of their engaging in destructive behavior." 202 Additionally, the loss of the sole caregiver may trigger the provisions of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), which terminates parental rights once a child has been in foster care for fifteen or more of the past twenty-two months. 203 One way to mitigate the effects of parental incarceration is through increased visitation. 204 However, several obstacles may inhibit visitation. The first and most obvious challenge is the distance that families must travel to see their loved ones in federal correctional facilities. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 84 percent of parents in the federal prison system are incarcerated more than 100 miles from their last residence. 205 This problem is heightened for women because there are only a handful of federal prisons for female inmates. 206 To make matters worse, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is not obligated to follow a sentencing judge's recommendation that a defendant be placed in a federal prison that is in close proximity to the inmate's family. 207 Closely related to the problem of location is the financial burden of travel, lodging, and meals that visitation presents. 208 These hardships acutely impact the families of drug couriers, who often already face financial difficulty that served as a-if not themotivation for the courier's criminal activity in the first place. 209 Moreover, many drug couriers have family overseas, 210 which makes visitation prohibitively expensive. Even where families can muster up the funds to visit a loved one in prison, many federal correctional facilities have visitation policies that make it difficult for incarcerated parents to interact with their children. 211 As a result, the innocent children and families of incarcerated parents suffer tremendously both during and after the term of incarceration. These burdens must be considered when assessing the true costs of the current enforcement policies vis-à-vis drug trafficking crimes. 211. See Cyphert, supra note 187, at 397 (discussing how inconvenient visitation hours, parking difficulties, a lack of private or child-friendly visitation rooms, and strict visitation eligibility rules can deter families, especially children, from visiting incarcerated parents).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) ("[F]amily ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant
Life After Incarceration
Another important consideration in determining the true costs of the current enforcement policies is the impact that incarceration has on the individual's future opportunities. As Professor Michelle Alexander wrote, the current "laws, rules, and regulations operate to discriminate against exoffenders and effectively prevent their reintegration into the mainstream society and economy." 212 Alexander added that the restrictions in place "amount to a form of 'civic death' and send the unequivocal message that 'they' are no longer part of 'us.'" 213 Formerly incarcerated individuals suffer many consequences that persist long after their sentences end, including, but not limited to, the loss of employment opportunities, 214 voting rights, 215 and public benefits. 216 The data indicate that past incarceration-of any length-negatively impacts an individual's employment prospects upon release. 217 According to the Prison Policy Initiative, the unemployment rate among formerly incarcerated individuals is 27 percent, 218 which is approximately five times higher than that of the general population. 219 It also surpasses the U.S. unemployment rate at the peak of the Great Depression, which was 25 percent. 220 Broken down by gender and race, the data show that formerly incarcerated Black and Hispanic women are in an even worse position, with unemployment rates of 43.6 percent and 39.4 percent, respectively. 221 Even where formerly incarcerated individuals do obtain employment, a significant percentage are only able to find part-time or occasional work. 222 Caribbean 224 and are Black or Hispanic, these figures indicate that the postincarceration job market looks even less promising for them, which exponentially increases the social costs of incarcerating them. 225 Even where the safety valve provision functions effectively, 226 and a defendant's prison sentence is significantly reduced, the defendant still faces the long-term consequences of being labeled a "convicted felon." 227 Among the vast consequences that individuals who have been convicted of felonies suffer, 228 one that is particularly important for convicted drug couriers is the loss of certain public benefits. 229 In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 230 which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. 231 TANF also included a number of provisions reining in welfare benefits by imposing strong work requirements 232 and closing out such benefits to individuals with felony convictions. 233 226. Several commentators have noted various flaws within the safety valve provision that prevent it from working effectively. See generally Bronn, supra note 58; Froyd, supra note 20. While this Note will discuss several drawbacks of the safety valve, it will not address these specific critiques. See infra Part IV.B. However, for a detailed discussion on the elements of the safety valve provision and a proposal on improving its efficacy, see generally Froyd, supra note 20. For specific analysis on the circuit split surrounding the interpretation of the fifth element of the safety valve, see generally Bronn, supra note 58.
227. This is also the case for individuals who qualify for the substantial assistance departure. However, because so few low-level drug couriers are able to provide new and useful information to prosecutors, most defendants who qualify for reduced sentences are benefitting from the safety valve provision. See infra Part III.B.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 190-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (describing the lost benefits that result from a felony conviction).
229. This section will focus primarily on individuals who were eligible to receive such benefits prior to their felony convictions. Because eligibility, in certain circumstances, may depend on an individual's citizenship status, not all individuals convicted of low-level drugtrafficking crimes may have been eligible to receive certain public benefits in the first place. This Note will not delve into the nuances of the eligibility rules but rather will explain the consequences of a drug felony conviction on individuals who were previously eligible to receive federal public assistance benefits. Individuals convicted as drug couriers under the importation statute fall squarely within this provision, and may thus suffer the severe consequence of a lifetime ban on receiving certain forms of public assistance. 235 Given the myriad of challenges that formerly incarcerated individuals face in finding employment 236 and the fact that this plight is even worse for Black and Hispanic women, 237 this is a particularly troublesome reality. If formerly incarcerated drug couriers cannot secure employment and are closed out from public assistance benefits, where do they turn? One option might be to return to criminal activity as a way to support themselves and their families. Another option might be to entrench themselves in their relationships with male partners, even if the men are abusive, involved in the drug trade, or both. Interestingly, the current policy of charging low-level drug couriers with felonies and sentencing them to extended periods of incarceration perpetuates the conditions that frequently push such individuals to commit drug-trafficking crimes in the first place. 238 Family disruption, difficulty finding employment, and loss of public benefits are just a few of the many collateral costs of a felony conviction and incarceration. Because these consequences acutely affect the subsets of individuals at the greatest risk of being recruited as drug couriers, like Black and Hispanic women, 239 these consequences are especially important in assessing the true costs of the current enforcement policies as they relate to low-level drug-trafficking crimes.
B. Going After the Minnows to Catch the . . . Minnows?
One common justification for pursuing harsh penalties for low-level drug offenders is that such penalties incentivize defendants to cooperate with the government and provide information that aids in prosecuting the more culpable higher-level offenders in the drug-trafficking organization. 240 The substantial assistance provision 241 -which offers defendants an avenue of relief from the mandatory sentence on the condition that they provide new and useful information to the government-reflects this consideration. 242 For most drug couriers, however, the substantial assistance provision is not a viable option for relief because drug-trafficking organizations often intentionally keep the couriers uninformed as a way to insulate their high- level members. 243 While couriers may have information on the individuals who originally gave them the drugs to import, this intelligence is often of little use to prosecutors because those individuals are typically outside the United States. 244 Additionally, the leaders of the drug-distribution conspiracy have every incentive to withhold the true identity of the person to whom the couriers are delivering the drugs and simply provide an alias or general description. 245 Because of the circumstances that render the couriers so vulnerable to being recruited in the first place, they often obey their superiors unquestioningly. 246 The disparate impact produced by the substantial assistance departure is well-documented and has been referred to as the "cooperation paradox." 247 Under the cooperation paradox, more culpable offenders receive lighter sentences because they possess valuable information, and low-level couriers receive harsher sentences because they have no information with which to bargain. 248 In the rare event that couriers possess information that they are willing to provide to the government, couriers are unlikely to benefit from it because it is either unreliable or already known. 249 The cooperation paradox demonstrates the flaws in the logic that going after the proverbial minnows is the best way to get the whales-at least in cases involving low-level drug couriers. If pursuing harsh penalties for low-level drug couriers is ineffective as a mechanism for prosecuting the more culpable dealers and distributors, what benefit do these policies actually offer?
C. Insufficient and Greater Than Necessary: Failures of the Current Policies Under the Various Theories of Punishment
In addition to failing to aid law enforcement in prosecuting high-level drug distributors, 250 the current enforcement policies of harshly penalizing lowlevel couriers fall short under the various punishment objectives set forth in the SRA. 251 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, courts must "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary" 252 to promote retributive principles, 253 to deter future criminal conduct, 254 to protect the public by 243 . See Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 211-13 (discussing the ways in which the substantial assistance provision benefits more culpable drug offenders, but not lower-level offenders); incapacitating the offender, 255 and to rehabilitate the defendant. 256 This section explores how the current policies fare in achieving each of these objectives.
Retribution
Advocates of retributivism or "just deserts"-unlike the forward-looking utilitarian theories of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-seek to impose on a defendant a "morally just" sanction that is commensurate with the degree of harm suffered by society. 257 One straightforward application of retribution as a theory of punishment is the death penalty. 258 By inflicting upon a defendant the same degree of harm that he or she has caused to his or her victim, capital punishment comports with the idea of lex talionis ("an eye for an eye") and illustrates retributive principles in their purest form. 259 Yet, with the exception of capital punishment, lex talionis is often too extreme in its practical application to be a guiding principle for advocates of the retributivist theory. 260 It also provides very little direction for punishing victimless crimes-including many of the drug crimes the federal government prosecutes. 261 A more workable application of retributivism focuses on the individual's moral blameworthiness and seeks an accordant punishment. 262 From this principle, it follows that more serious crimes (i.e., those that involve a higher degree of moral blameworthiness) should be punished more severely. 263 Weight-based enforcement policies for drug crimes find their justification in retributivist principles. 264 To illustrate, if one measures the harm inflicted upon society by the quantity of drugs that end up on the street, then a retributivist would likely support a weight-based sentence by associating the quantity of drugs with the quantity of harm perpetuated. 265 retributivism looks not only at the harm society suffers but also the moral blameworthiness of the defendant. 266 To equate societal harm with moral blameworthiness would be to take an overly simplistic view of retributivism. 267 Drug couriers, despite the quantity of drugs they import (and the risk they assume), occupy the lowest levels of the drug-trafficking organization's hierarchy and derive very little benefit from their actions. 268 This reality must be considered in assessing their moral blameworthiness through a retributivist lens. 269 Couriers agree to undertake these high-risk, low-reward trips because of the difficult circumstances they face. 270 Poverty, extreme deprivation, and fear all limit the choices that individuals have and increase the likelihood that they will resort to crime. 271 It follows that individuals from these backgrounds are less culpable and less morally blameworthy than others who have a wider range of choices. 272 Because the current weight-based enforcement policies for drug-trafficking crimes fail to account for the defendant's role in the organization and his or her overall moral culpability, 273 they fail to satisfy the objectives of retribution as a theory of punishment.
Deterrence
The second factor that district courts should consider under § 3553 is whether the punishment will "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." 274 Deterrence, as a normative goal of punishment, comes in two forms: general deterrence and specific deterrence. 275 General deterrence seeks to structure punishments in a way that will discourage all potential lawbreakers from committing crimes. 276 Specific deterrence shifts the focus to the specific offender, asking whether the punishment he or she currently suffers will prevent him or her from committing crimes in the future. 277 Specific deterrence is only a consideration once general deterrence has failed and the threat of punishment was not enough to prevent the individual from committing the crime. 278 From a general deterrence perspective, the current policy of pursuing harsh penalties for low-level drug couriers is unlikely to have a measurable impact on drug-trafficking crimes. 279 In general, the value of severe criminal penalties as a deterrent is questionable. 280 While there is evidence to support the value of punishment as an important mechanism for deterring crime, 281 the evidence fails to support the conclusion that the deterrent effect becomes more powerful as the severity of the punishment increases. 282 Instead, increasing punishment severity produces diminishing marginal returns in terms of crime control and deterrence. 283 Deterrence theory is also premised on the assumption that individuals are self-interested, rational actors who evaluate the costs and benefits of their actions. 284 It is questionable whether people actually conform their behavior to this model. 285 It is true that human beings are rational in that they understand costs and benefits and respond to them accordingly. 286 But there are a number of factors that impact the extent of human rationality and thus the predictive capabilities of the deterrence model. 287 One important factor that affects this internal cost-benefit analysis is the immediacy of those costs or benefits. 288 Because punishments are usually not suffered until long into the future, as compared to gains, which are generally immediate, the costbenefit calculus becomes skewed and the punishment's deterrent effect more limited. 289 Harsh sentences are particularly ineffective in deterring most low-level drug couriers, whose circumstances make it even less likely that they will be able to rationally assess the costs and benefits of their actions. 290 A substantial number of low-level drug couriers resort to criminal conduct as a result of grave economic difficulties. 291 The circumstances these couriers face are likely to skew the cost-benefit calculation underlying the theory of deterrence. 292 First and foremost, individuals coming from economic disadvantage have less to lose than those coming from privilege. 293 Furthermore, evidence indicates that poverty negatively impacts the development of children, which leads to poor impulse control. 294 Lawmakers should take these observations into account in evaluating the deterrent value of harsh criminal punishments for drug couriers, many of whom have lived their entire lives in dire economic circumstances. 295 The same logic applies to couriers who are victims of abuse or who are under other forms of threat. 296 To the extent that the courier calculates the costs and benefits of her decision to smuggle drugs, at the forefront of her mind is inevitably the immediate abuse that she will suffer if she does not participate. 297 The legal punishment she may suffer in the future is likely to play a lesser role in her calculation compared to the more immediate costs or benefits that tend to weigh more heavily in the decision-making process. 298 It would exceed the bounds of logic to conclude that harsh criminal penalties could deter individuals who are already risking their lives for a relatively small monetary gain. 299 In the case of couriers who ingest dozens of heroin-or cocaine-filled pellets, the risk of death or serious bodily injury is significant. 300 If the individual rationally assesses the decision to smuggle drugs and decides that risking her life is worth a few thousand dollars, then her current circumstances are likely so dire that a harsh criminal penalty is unlikely to have any deterrent effect. If the individual is not rationally calculating the costs and benefits of her decision to smuggle, it undercuts the very foundation on which deterrence theory rests. Whichever it is, increasing the severity of criminal penalties is unlikely to impact their deterrent value vis-à-vis low-level drug couriers.
Incapacitation
Much like deterrence, incapacitation is a consequentialist theory of punishment, which seeks to impose penalties as a means of preventing future crime. 301 However, incapacitation theory is more narrowly focused in that punishments are designed to prevent individuals from committing future offenses. 302 The most common way to incapacitate an individual, and prevent her from committing future crimes, is through incarceration. 303 In its simplest terms, incapacitation seems to provide an adequate justification for the current enforcement of low-level drug couriers. By sentencing couriers to long terms of incarceration, the justice system prevents them from importing more drugs into the United States during their sentence and effectively satisfies the objective of incapacitation. 304 However, incapacitation theory is much more nuanced, and it is important to analyze those intricacies before fairly assessing whether it justifies long prison sentences for low-level drug couriers. Proponents of incapacitation theory emphasize the importance of optimal incapacitation, which involves arriving at a sentence for which the benefits of incapacitation outweigh the costs of incarceration. 305 In this respect, incapacitation theory involves a cost-benefit analysis, where the benefits are the social improvements that result from having individuals incarcerated 306 and the costs are not only the financial costs of incarceration, but also the collateral damage resulting from incarceration. 307 Thus, if the sentence is excessive and its costs outweigh its benefits, it does not provide optimal incapacitation. Crucial to measuring the benefit derived from incapacitating an individual who has committed an offense is the replacement effect of an arrest and subsequent incarceration of a defendant. 308 That is, incapacitation is only effective at reducing crime insofar as new individuals are not willing to replace incarcerated individuals. 309 Many of the shortcomings of the War on Drugs may be due in some part to the replacement effects of incarcerating individuals involved in drug crimes, 310 which are particularly apparent in the case of low-level drug couriers. A review of the legislative history of the 1986 Amendments reveals that Congress did not consider the possible replacement effects of implementing harsh mandatory sentences for lowlevel offenders. 311 Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the criminal acts of many low-level drug couriers strongly support the conclusion that they are disposable and easily replaceable resources in the scheme of the larger drug operation. 312 Because the socioeconomic circumstances that render so many individuals vulnerable to recruitment as couriers broadly affect communities, compared to specific individuals, it is likely very easy for drug organizations to choose from an abundant supply of potential couriers. 313 The fact that many couriers are kept uninformed of the details of the importation conspiracy-as a way to insulate the higher-ups in the event that the couriers are apprehended-further supports this conclusion. 314 Drug organizations need not provide couriers with any potentially valuable information, because of the ease with which they can find new recruits whose circumstances render them desperate enough to accept the high-risk, lowreward role of a courier. 315 The Commission corroborates these conclusions, finding that 77 percent of cocaine couriers are engaged in a single transaction. 316 To achieve true incapacitation and crime control, resources would be better spent addressing the circumstances that make drug couriering such an attractive option for vulnerable individuals in impoverished communities. Efforts to increase economic opportunities and to provide actual relief to victims of domestic violence might be more effective in preventing individuals from acting as drug couriers than would incarcerating them.
Incapacitation need not come in the form of incarceration; in fact, it need not come in the form of punishment at all. 317 For example, helping a person find gainful employment may very well stop her from dealing drugs because it provides her with a steady income and takes up time that she might otherwise spend fraternizing with drug organizations. 318 Similarly, providing someone with an opportunity to become a prosperous member of her community might incapacitate her motivation to become a drug courier. 319 Such efforts would also reduce the replacement effect of individuals who do commit crimes and are caught because they would lower the supply of vulnerable recruits. 320 However, the current regime focuses on incarceration as the proper way to incapacitate drug couriers and restrict future crime. In doing so, it fails to recognize the circumstances of the people whom they are prosecuting and, as a result, fails to achieve real reform. 321 
Rehabilitation
The final factor that § 3553(a)(2) instructs courts to consider focuses on the rehabilitation of the defendant. 322 Incarceration may be a useful mechanism for achieving rehabilitation to the extent that it can provide incarcerated individuals with the tools and training they need to succeed when their sentence ends and they return to society. 323 But the current policies, which have resulted in tremendous growth in the prison population, 324 have made rehabilitation very difficult to achieve in the federal correctional system. Prison overcrowding is a well-documented obstacle to effective rehabilitation because it threatens the prison's ability to provide basic human needs, like healthcare and food, let alone effective educational and training programs. 325 If the current policy of pursuing long prison sentences for low-level drug couriers continues and prison populations continue to grow, rehabilitation efforts will inevitably suffer. 326 Because women are often recruited as low-level drug couriers and subsequently incarcerated, 327 the correctional system should recognize the differences between men and women, including their pathways to crime and how the criminal justice system should address them. 328 However, it was not until relatively recently that these differences were even acknowledged in the field of criminology, 329 and the male-centric criminal justice system has been slow to respond with efforts to effectively rehabilitate women. 330 Approximately 90 percent of women suffer from some form of trauma when entering the correctional system, 331 which may be the result of physical or sexual abuse or separation from their children. 332 However, female correctional facilities have been ill-equipped to address these issues. 333 A September 2018 Office of the Inspector General report reviewing the BOP's management of female inmates identified a number of flaws in the BOP's trauma treatment program, including inadequate staffing, which render the program ineffective. 334 Until the BOP implements the necessary changes to ensure that all inmates in need of trauma-related services receive them, effective rehabilitation cannot be achieved for a substantial number of drug couriers in the federal correctional system.
IV. THE COURIER CARVEOUT: A LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION TO THE HIGH COSTS OF PROSECUTING LOW-LEVEL DRUG COURIERS
The current enforcement policy of pursuing harsh punishments for lowlevel drug couriers is costly, both monetarily and in terms of the collateral damage it imposes on the defendants and innocent third parties. 335 Furthermore, the benefits of these policies fail to outweigh their costs. Because low-level drug couriers often possess little to no information on the larger operation, harsh enforcement policies are not effective mechanisms for incentivizing cooperation or obtaining important information on more culpable players within the drug enterprise. 336 Moreover, the current sentencing schemes fail to satisfy the objectives of the punishment laid out in the SRA. 337 This Note proposes a legislative amendment to the federal importation statute, 338 which would create a carveout for low-level drug couriers who meet certain criteria. The provision would require that defendants meeting the criteria be charged with a separate misdemeanor falling outside the realm of the Guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentences currently in place under § 960. 339 
A. Proposed Criteria
The criteria used to determine whether a defendant qualifies for the misdemeanor carveout would correlate to certain factors that indicate an individual's position within the hierarchy of a drug organization. Fortunately, one need not look far for suitable models because the Holder Memo laid out a set of criteria for AUSAs to use to determine whether a defendant was a low-level participant. 340 The Holder Memo criteria focused on the use of weapons or violence, the involvement of minors, whether the defendant was a leader in or had ties to the drug-trafficking organization, and whether the defendant had a criminal history. 341 These criteria serve as a useful starting point, but they fail to address the specific factors that make an individual a leader, a high-ranking member, or a low-level participant in the drug-trafficking enterprise.
The safety valve provision represents another effort to identify low-level participants and provide relief from the mandatory minimum sentences in place. 342 The safety valve criteria do not differ much from the Holder Memo criteria as they also focus on, inter alia, criminal history, 343 the use of violence or weapons, 344 and whether the defendant was a leader or organizer. 345 However, the safety valve criteria also fail to specify the characteristics common to low-ranking members in a drug-trafficking organization. However, an article critiquing the safety valve criteria listed specific factors that could serve as a useful starting point for a statutory carveout. 346 The critique proposed an amendment to the safety valve provision, which would direct courts to consider the following criteria:
whether the defendant received a small, flat fee payment versus a percentage of profits; whether the defendant simply delivered drugs one way and did not deliver money in return; whether the defendant received a prepackaged bag; whether the defendant delivered the package to a previously unknown individual; whether the defendant negotiated the terms of the sale; and whether the defendant owned or financed the drugs involved. 347 These factors directly address many of the experiences common to low-level drug couriers 348 and would thus effectively filter them out while still maintaining harsher penalties for those occupying more senior roles in the drug organization.
B. Advantages of the Carveout
A statutory carveout specifically targeting low-level couriers has several important advantages over the current policies. First, the amendment would move the law away from the current quantity-based model. 349 It would charge and punish individuals based not on the weight of drugs they possess, but on their actual culpability, as derived from their status in the drugtrafficking enterprise. It was the goal of the drafters of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act to punish high-level players more severely, 350 but those drafters wrongly assumed that the quantity of drugs in one's possession was the best indicator of status. 351 A carveout exempting qualifying low-level couriers from mandatory minimum sentences, but maintaining such punishments for high-level players, is consistent with the goals of the drafters of the 1986 Amendments. This proposal also recognizes that not all drug couriers are alike, and thus the criteria would effectively distinguish between experienced couriers and low-level couriers. By more accurately assessing and punishing based on culpability, this legislative amendment also satisfies retributivist goals of punishment. 352 Although the safety valve also functions to spare low-level drug offenders from harsh mandatory minimum sentences, 353 it has a number of flaws that an amendment to the importation statute could address. First, even where the safety valve functions effectively, defendants can still face substantial prison sentences under the Guidelines. 354 Amendments equated drug quantity with status), with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 5, at 168 (articulating how the quantity of drugs involved in an offense is not an indicator of one's role in the offense).
352. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (explaining how retributivist goals are best served by punishing according to one's moral blameworthiness).
353. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 354. According to the Guidelines, a defendant with no criminal history whose conduct triggers a five-year mandatory minimum sentence and who qualifies for the safety valve is still subject to a twenty-four month sentence, on the low end. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
Guidelines, the problem of excessive judicial discretion arises. Certain lowlevel defendants may receive leniency, while others still face harsh punishments. This problem is precisely what sparked the massive transformation of sentencing law in the early 1980s. 355 By amending the importation statute, all defendants meeting the criteria would be charged with a newly created misdemeanor offense, which only carries a maximum sentence of one year. 356 This amendment would significantly narrow the range of possible sentences available to the judge and would promote uniformity among similarly situated offenders without sacrificing the ability of the law to distinguish between offenders demonstrating different levels of culpability.
Additionally, the safety valve does not address the long-term consequences that accompany a felony conviction, such as the inability to secure employment 357 and the loss of certain public benefits, 358 even in cases where its application spares the defendant of prison entirely. By charging a qualifying defendant with a misdemeanor rather than a felony, this proposed amendment would significantly reduce the collateral costs incurred by society under the current system. Charging low-level couriers with a misdemeanor would also result in monetary cost savings because it would reduce the number of people in the prison system overall and may further preserve resources by inducing more defendants to accept plea deals rather than going to trial. This would not only give defendants the ability to move forward with their lives, but it would also free up prosecutors to use their resources to pursue more dangerous offenders.
Finally, a legislative amendment has certain advantages over executive action like the Holder Memo. While executive action is easier to implement, it is also easier to overturn, as was the case when former Attorney General Sessions revoked the Holder Memo. 359 Although this proposal would require approval in both houses of Congress and the president's signature, its effects would endure. A legislative solution-if passed-would also more accurately reflect the democratic preferences of the American people than would executive action.
C. Potential Limitations
One of the main limitations of this proposal is that it still leaves prosecutors with considerable discretion to charge low-level drug couriers under other statutes that trigger mandatory minimum sentences. For example, a prosecutor could charge a low-level courier under 21 U.S.C. § 841, which makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess with the intent to 355 distribute a controlled substance. 360 Alternatively, a prosecutor could achieve the same result by charging a low-level courier who transported drugs via airplane under 21 U.S.C. § 959. 361 One way to address this issue would be to simply trust prosecutors to charge low-level drug couriers under the newly created misdemeanor carveout. 362 A more effective, albeit more difficult, resolution would involve amending each and every felony provision under which prosecutors could plausibly charge low-level drug couriers to include this carveout for qualifying defendants. While this would require significantly more congressional action, it would effectively remove the possibility that low-level drug couriers are charged with felonies that trigger mandatory minimum penalties.
Critics of this proposal may argue that it is unlikely to produce any direct benefits-other than a reduction in costs-distinct from those currently provided by enacted laws and policies. For example, it may be argued that creating a misdemeanor carveout would be unlikely to serve as a more effective deterrent than the current policies 363 or induce more cooperation of low-level players than the current policies do. 364 But, as discussed above, empirical evidence does not support a correlation between punishment severity and deterrence. 365 Moreover, low-level drug couriers are unlikely to possess any helpful information for government investigators. 366 Thus, while these justifications may have been rationally employed to undergird prior criminal justice reforms, their subsequent repudiation renders them ineffective as critiques of this proposal.
In addition, this proposal may give rise to indirect long-term benefits. From a rehabilitation perspective, for example, incarcerating fewer people, and reducing the sentences of those who are incarcerated, may allow the correctional system to more adequately utilize its resources for the individuals in the system. 367 Similarly, this proposal would reduce the collateral effects of long-term incarceration on children and families, which include reduced educational achievement and an increased likelihood of future criminal activity. 368 From an incapacitation perspective, this proposal would shrink the pool of potential recruits for drug-trafficking organizations by opening doors that would otherwise remain closed. 369 
